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I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued several bankruptcy-related deci-
sions that may impact the bankruptcy practice. In mid-January 2020, the
Supreme Court tackled and clarified the finality of bankruptcy court or-
ders in the stay context. In addition, insolvency cases contributed to im-
portant jurisprudence, including on the Appointments Clause, and the
existence and scope of the federal common law. Also in this Survey is a
discussion of recent developments in the Puerto Rican bankruptcy, the
largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. Finally, courts continue to
rule on important aspects of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. The
selection of cases for this year’s Survey is not exhaustive but is illustrative
of significant legal developments of use to practitioners and judges alike.
II. APPEALS OF AUTOMATIC STAY ORDERS
A. USE IT OR LOSE IT: THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED THAT AN
ORDER DENYING RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY IS
FINAL AND APPEALABLE
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition automati-
cally halts any creditor’s debt-collection effort, including the continuation
of a lawsuit to recover from the debtor that is outside the umbrella of the
bankruptcy case.1 A creditor may request relief from this automatic stay,
but it is up to the bankruptcy court to grant such relief.2 The finality of
the order granting or denying it—and therefore its appealability—was the
concern of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ritzen Group, Inc. v.
Jackson Masonry, LLC.3 In other words, the Court asked whether “a
creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay initiate[s] a distinct
proceeding terminating in a final, appealable order” once the bankruptcy
court rules on the motion.4 Unanimously, the Court answered in the
affirmative.5
Initially, Ritzen Group, Inc. (Ritzen) agreed to buy land in Tennessee
from Jackson Masonry, LLC (Jackson).6 The sale was never made, and
subsequently, Ritzen sued for breach of contract in Tennessee state
court.7 Days before trial was to begin, Jackson filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, pausing the state court litigation by operation of § 362(a).8 Believ-
ing that Jackson had filed bankruptcy in bad faith, Ritzen filed a motion
for relief from the automatic stay in hopes that it could obtain an order
1. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586–89 (2020) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)).








allowing the state court litigation to proceed.9 Eventually, the bankruptcy
court denied the motion.10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a), a party must appeal from a final order
within fourteen days of when the order being appealed was entered.11
However, Ritzen did not appeal within the time frame.12 Instead, it filed
a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate, which initiated an adver-
sary proceeding, resulting in the bankruptcy court’s finding Ritzen to be
in breach.13 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court confirmed Jackson’s plan of
reorganization.14
Afterward, Ritzen filed a notice of appeal in district court challenging
the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay.15
However, the district court rejected this appeal as untimely because the
“time to appeal expired 14 days after the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt’s entry of
the order denying relief from the automatic stay.”16 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
In its analysis, the Court first looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,18 which states
that a party may appeal as of right from “final decisions of the district
courts.”19 Generally, a final decision is “limited to an order that resolves
the entire case.”20 However, because of the complexity of a bankruptcy
case and the fact that it may involve multiple individual controversies that
could exist as “stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the
debtor,”21 a final decision may be rendered even though the overarching
bankruptcy case may still be pending.22 More specifically, § 158(a) pro-
vides that a party may appeal as of right from “‘final judgments, orders,
and decrees’ entered by bankruptcy courts ‘in cases and proceedings.’”23
Therefore, in bankruptcy, the unit of measure used to determine finality,
and therefore appealability, is often the proceeding that “dispose[s] of
discrete disputes” within the overarching bankruptcy case.24
Next, the Court looked to its opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank to
guide the finality requirement’s application within § 158(a).25 In that
case, the Court held that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2); and then quoting FED. R. BANKR. P.
8002(a)).
12. Id. at 587.
13. Id.




18. Id. at 586.
19. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015)).
22. Id. at 586–87.
23. Id. at 587 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)).
24. Id. (quoting Bullard, 575 U.S. at 501).
25. Id. at 588.
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Chapter 13 repayment plan was not final because it did not resolve the
relevant proceeding.26 As the Court further explained, only plan approval
“alters the status quo and fixes the rights and obligations of the parties”
to be characterized as final.27
Therefore, the Court was tasked to answer the question of whether ad-
judication of a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a discrete pro-
ceeding or is a “first step in the process of” resolving “a creditor’s claim
against the estate.”28 In choosing the former option, the Court noted that
adjudication of such a motion “initiates a discrete procedural sequence”
that commences with notice and a hearing and concludes with the appli-
cation of the statutory standard for a creditor to qualify for such relief.29
Resolution of this motion is “anterior to, and separate from, claim-resolu-
tion proceedings.”30
In its unanimous decision, the Court specifically addressed each of
Ritzen’s arguments in detail and made specific reference as to why each
was an incorrect interpretation of the finality and appealability of an or-
der regarding a stay-relief motion.31 First, Ritzen argued that such an or-
der denying relief “simply decide[d] the forum for adjudication of
adversary claims” and therefore should be treated as simply a preliminary
step in resolving the creditor’s claim.32 The Court acknowledged that res-
olution of the motion determines whether the forum will be bankruptcy
court or state court, but it was also quick to point out that that effect
“does not render a ruling nonfinal.”33 For example, an order of dismissal
for improper venue or lack of personal jurisdiction is considered a final
and immediately appealable decision.34 Alternatively, Ritzen argued that
the order should be considered nonfinal where the court’s decision turns
on a substantive issue that could be raised later, such as determining
whether Jackson filed in bad faith.35 However, the Court found this argu-
ment less than persuasive because § 158(a) is concerned with whether a
procedural unit has been terminated and not whether the court made a
determination that could be pertinent to other disputes within the case.36
Ultimately, because the Court considered an adjudication of the stay-
relief motion as the proper proceeding, the bankruptcy court’s order de-
nying it was “final and immediately appealable.”37 The Court affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of Ritzen’s appeal as untimely.38
26. Id. (quoting Bullard, 575 U.S. at 499, 502–03).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 589.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 590–91.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 590.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 591.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 592.
38. Id.
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From a policy standpoint, typing an order denying relief from the auto-
matic stay as nonfinal, and therefore not immediately appealable, would
backlog the appeals process and could unravel the adjudication of an en-
tire bankruptcy case, as many controversies within the case are interde-
pendent.39 As Justice Ginsburg noted, “[r]eversal of a decision made
early on could require the bankruptcy court to unravel later adjudications
rendered in reliance on [that] earlier decision.”40 Like the game of Jenga,
if a block is allowed to be moved and the rest of the structure is reliant on
its subsequent placement, moving it later on instead of immediately could
jeopardize the structure and destroy what has already been created.
III. LIMITING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. THE BOB RICHARDS RULE: THE SUPREME COURT LIMITED THE
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN BANKRUPTCY
CASES
In Rodriguez v. FDIC,41 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the nearly
half-century-old Bob Richards rule,42 which specified how federal tax
proceeds are allocated amongst affiliated members of a corporation that
file consolidated returns.43 In the narrowest sense, the Rodriguez Court
sought resolution as to whether state or federal law determined the own-
ership of a federal tax refund paid to a parent company despite being
created out of one of its subsidiary companies’ income and assets.44 The
Court utilized the bankruptcy case to underscore that federal common
law is to be applied only when “necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests.”45
The dispute in Rodriguez involved a rumble over a tax refund as affili-
ated entities and caretakers of United Western Bancorp and United
Western Bank—including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and the Trustee—sought to claim the $4 million refund pay-
ment.46 The subsidiary company, United Western Bank, entered receiver-
ship with the FDIC, which assumed control of the bank. Soon after that,
United Western Bancorp filed for bankruptcy protection.47 The two com-
panies filed a consolidated tax return for the prior year, and the IRS is-
sued the subsidiary’s tax refund to the parent company.48 As the parent
company entered bankruptcy, the Trustee appointed in the case sought to
hold on to the $4 million while the subsidiary, through the FDIC, sought
39. Id. at 587.
40. Id.
41. 140 S. Ct. 713, 713 (2020).
42. Id.
43. In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1973).
44. See Rodriguez, 140 S. Ct. at 713.
45. Id. at 717.
46. Id. at 716.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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to recover the payment.49
In determining the tax refund’s proper allocation, the bankruptcy court
needed to decide whether to apply state or federal law.50 Simply put,
state law has established case law for contract interpretation, rules of eq-
uity, and other methods of resolution that would aid in determining
proper refund allocation. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit created its own common law, namely that of the Bob Rich-
ards rule, which can also determine the allocation between affiliated enti-
ties.51 The rule states that, “in the absence of a tax allocation agreement”
between affiliates, the refund belongs to the member “responsible for the
losses that led to it.”52 The lower court, whose ruling was later affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit, found in favor of the FDIC because the subsidiary
bank was responsible for the loss that resulted in the refund.53 Standing
in direct opposition to the Ninth Circuit is the Sixth Circuit, which stated
that applying federal common law such as the Bob Richards rule required
a uniquely federal interest.54
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit in that
there is no uniquely federal interest present to justify the use of federal
common law.55 As such, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.56 The Court did not ex-
pressly decide to whom the tax refund belonged because the state law is
replete with the tools necessary to make such a determination.
In and of itself, Rodriguez v. FDIC will not be a Supreme Court case
that causes a big fuss and stir amongst the bankruptcy bar. In truth, the
Supreme Court’s decision to effectively dispose of the Bob Richards rule
will have limited application in the future. However, the Court’s decision
to limit the use of federal common law and how to interpret issues arising
from the Internal Revenue Code is instructive. In his majority opinion,
Justice Gorsuch states that the Court “took this case only to underscore
the care federal courts should exercise before taking up an invitation to
try their hand at common lawmaking.”57 The Court seems keen on re-
stricting the use of the federal common law tools unless circumstances
necessitate such use. The tale of the demise of the nearly-century-old Bob






54. See id. at 717 (citing FDIC v. AmFin Fin. Corp., 757 F.3d 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2014)).
55. Id. at 718.
56. Id. at 719.
57. Id. at 718.
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IV. PUERTO RICO
A. LOCAL POWERS IN THE PUERTO RICO TERRITORY: THE SUPREME
COURT ADDRESSED THE CONSTITUTION AND PUERTO RICO’S
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Puerto Rico’s financial crisis primarily began in 2006 when the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 expired and many businesses across
various industries left Puerto Rico due to a lack of tax benefits.58 In re-
sponse to businesses leaving, the territory accumulated a substantial
amount of debt.59 Puerto Rico sought to restructure its debt; however,
the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the territory to file bankruptcy as a
municipality.60 Furthermore, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code pre-
empted Puerto Rico’s local debt statutes.61 Congress took action by
utilizing its constitutional powers to create laws regulating U.S. territo-
ries,62 and enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Eco-
nomic Stability Act (PROMESA).63 PROMESA allowed Puerto Rico to
file bankruptcy and created the Financial Oversight and Management
Board (the Board), which consisted of seven members appointed by the
President without Senate confirmation.64 Once proceedings began, sev-
eral creditors moved to have the case dismissed based on constitutional
grounds, namely that the appointments of the Board’s members violated
the Appointments Clause.65 The creditors’ motions led to the litigation in
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius
Investment, LLC.
The Supreme Court heard the case on certiorari from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.66 The First Circuit ruled that the members
of the Board were “officers of the United States” because the members
had continuing positions under federal law: they exercised considerable
authority to initiate the municipal bankruptcy proceeding; the members
had broad investigatory and enforcement powers that amounted to judi-
cial officers; and the Board’s authority was rooted in federal law.67 Thus,
Article II, Clause 2 of the Constitution required the President to obtain
the Senate’s advice and consent before members’ appointments could be
confirmed.68 The Court unanimously reversed the First Circuit’s holding,
ruling that the Constitution did not prohibit the President from ap-
pointing members without senatorial advice and consent to serve on the
58. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655
(2020).
59. Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c), 101(52), 901–946.
61. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
63. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241.
64. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1655.
65. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 318 F. Supp. 3d 537, 556–57 (D.P.R.
2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
66. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1656.
67. Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 856–57 (1st Cir. 2019).
68. Id. at 861; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
Board.69
The Court made a significant initial finding that the Appointments
Clause does restrict the appointment of officers of the United States
when the officers serve the territories, such as Puerto Rico.70 Looking at
the Constitution through both a structural and a textual lens, the Court
found that the separation of powers along with checks and balances were
fundamental in the Appointments Clause, and that the Clause was not
limited.71 Indeed, the Appointments Clause has no exception; all officers
of the United States require the Senate’s advice and consent.72 Addition-
ally, the Court grounded its initial finding in several historical instances
where officers of the United States serving the territories required Senate
confirmation.73 However, the Court did not end its analysis when it found
that the Appointments Clause does apply to the territories. Before the
Court, the question was whether the Board’s members were the kind of
federal officers of the United States that required Senate confirmation.
Put more simply, the issue was whether the Board members had local
duties and powers that would exclude their appointments from requiring
Senate confirmation.74
The Constitution emphasizes the separation of powers between the
federal and state governments but also recognizes that there would be
entities that are neither federal nor state, particularly the District of Co-
lumbia and U.S. territories.75 The Constitution gives Congress authority
to legislate on behalf of those non-federal and non-state entities.76 There
is an essential distinction between federal and local laws when Congress
utilizes its powers to legislate for local governments—Congress creates
local laws and local offices, not federal laws and offices, when it acts on
behalf of the territories. That distinction brings the Board members’ ap-
pointments outside the Appointments Clause if the Board members’ du-
ties are primarily local instead of federal.77
PROMESA clearly stated that the Board is an entity within Puerto
Rico and not a part of the federal government.78 Of course, the Court
could not exclusively rely on that statement, so it examined the substance
of PROMESA to evaluate the nature of the Board’s powers. Principally,
the Court saw that the Board is paid through the Puerto Rican govern-
ment; its judicial jurisdiction is solely within Puerto Rico and local laws;
its powers relating to fiscal management are limited to Puerto Rico; and
PROMESA encourages the Board to work closely with the local govern-
ment to develop plans and budgets to bring Puerto Rico out of financial
69. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1665.
70. Id. at 1658.
71. Id. at 1658–59.
72. Id. at 1656 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1659.
74. Id. at 1658.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
76. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
77. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1661.
78. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241.
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despair, even though the Board does possess the authority to act against
the Puerto Rican government when necessary.79 The Board’s enforce-
ment powers are rooted in Puerto Rican law, not federal law.80 The
Board’s duties and powers relate to Puerto Rico as a territory, and the
Board’s members act in the interest of Puerto Rico rather than the
United States.81 Thus, the Court concluded, the members are local of-
ficers, and their appointments are outside the Appointments Clause and
did not require Senate confirmation.82
The Court addressed a counterargument focused on the national conse-
quences of Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy proceedings, but it quickly disposed
of this argument. The Court noted that any Chapter 9 municipal bank-
ruptcy, or even a large corporate bankruptcy, can have a national impact,
but that does not cause any particular representation to become “officers
of the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.83
Additionally, the Court corrected the First Circuit’s reasoning based on
Buckley v. Valeo, Freytag v. Commissioner, and Lucia v. SEC.84 The cited
cases did not analyze the officers’ local or federal nature; instead, the
cases analyzed the meaning of “officers” for the purposes of the Constitu-
tion.85 In Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v.
Aurelius Investment, LLC, the central question was whether the members
have primarily local or federal duties based on the federally enacted stat-
ute, PROMESA. To reiterate, PROMESA situated the Board within Pu-
erto Rico and gave the Board local powers and duties that are limited to
Puerto Rico and enforceable by the territory’s local laws. The Constitu-
tion’s Appointments Clause did not require the President to obtain Sen-
ate advice and consent to confirm the appointments because the
members do not have federal duties.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Financial Oversight and Management
Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC will primarily impact
the Puerto Rican bankruptcy, but its holdings could be significant consid-
ering the recent economic climate brought on by the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The United States has fifty states; the District of Columbia; and
seventeen commonwealths, territories, various insular or outlying areas,
and freely associated states.86 Much like the states, the United States’
79. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1661–63.
80. Id. at 1662.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1662–63.
83. Id. at 1662.
84. Id. at 1663 (first citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976) (per curiam); then
citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 868 (1991); and then citing Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2044 (2018)).
85. Id. (first citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1; then citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868; and then
citing Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2044).
86. How Are U.S. States, Territories, and Commonwealths Designated in the Geo-
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non-state entities are experiencing a negative financial impact from the
COVID-19 pandemic,87 and depending on their pre-pandemic financial
situation, the United States could see more non-state entities attempt to
restructure debt. The Bankruptcy Code provisions that prevented Puerto
Rico from initially filing bankruptcy would also prevent other non-state
entities from utilizing Chapter 9.88 To provide an avenue to restructure
debt, Congress could pass acts similar to PROMESA but relating to the
particular non-state entity. Even if Congress does enact a statute that
would require Senate confirmation, the Court clearly established that
Congress’s choice to require Senate confirmation for officers with local
duties would not per se require all future local officers to be appointed
with Senate confirmation. Instead, it would reflect the discretion that
Congress is afforded by the Constitution when legislating for territories
of the United States. Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling refines the federal
government’s power by affirming that Congress can create local offices
that can be filled without Senate confirmation.
The case has another significant impact that the Court addressed. Had
the Court found that the Board members were officers of the United
States for purposes of the Appointments Clause, other Puerto Rican
elected and appointed officials’ offices could have been called into ques-
tion, and it could have threatened the validity of the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment.89 If the Court ruled in that manner, it could have also called
into question the validity of other non-state governments whose officials
are not appointed with Senate confirmation. While the issue before the
Court primarily resolves the constitutionality of the Board members’ ap-
pointment, the Court also affirmed the constitutionality of other com-
monwealth and territorial governments.
V. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
A. SUPREME COURT CLOSES ONE DOOR IN FDCPA SUITS, BUT MAY
HAVE LEFT ANOTHER OPEN
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a private citi-
zen may bring suit against a debt collector who engages in unauthorized
practices within one year of the violation.90 The FDCPA protects the lay
citizen from the overeager collector who skirts fair and equitable debt
recovery practices. Under the FDCPA, the one-year statute of limitations
ensures that the aggrieved party brings suit promptly.91 However, does
such a statute of limitations toll when the aggrieved party does not learn
of the alleged wrongdoing until more than six years after the incident? In
87. See Federal Assistance to the U.S. Territories and Freely Associated States During
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https:/
/www.doi.gov/oia/covid19 [https://perma.cc/LV37-LCZL].
88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c), 101(52), 901–946.
89. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1677–79.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
91. See id.
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such a scenario, do principles of equity permit the aggrieved party to
bring suit within one year of discovery of the violation? In an 8–1 deci-
sion in Rotkiske v. Klemm,92 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the stat-
ute means exactly what it says and that such an action must be brought
within one year of the violation itself instead of the discovery of such
violation.93
In 2008, petitioner Rotkiske defaulted on approximately $1,200.00 in
credit card debt, after which the credit card company hired the respon-
dent Klemm’s collection agency.94 The very same year, Klemm brought
suit against Rotkiske seeking recovery of the amount owed.95 Klemm dis-
missed the lawsuit after serving process to someone who did not match
Rotkiske’s description at an address where Rotkiske no longer lived.96
The following year, Klemm filed suit and yet again served process to
someone other than Rotkiske.97 Soon after that, Klemm received a de-
fault judgment because no opposing party responded to the court-issued
summons.98
Rotkiske did not learn of the judgment against him until September
2014, and he finally brought suit against Klemm for violations of the
FDCPA in June 2015.99 The issue that ultimately arrived at the Supreme
Court was whether equitable tolling excused his otherwise late filing.
While the language of the statute plainly states that suit must be brought
within one year of the violation, Rotkiske sought for the Court to apply
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s “discovery rule,” which
states that statutes of limitations generally toll from when plaintiffs know
or have reason to know of their injury.100
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, conducted a dictionary analy-
sis of the words “violation” and “occur” to conclude that the FDCPA
“unambiguously sets the date of the violation as the event that starts the
one-year limitations period.”101 On this point, all nine Justices were in
agreement: it is inappropriate to read the discovery rule in direct contra-
diction to the language of the statute. However, Justice Ginsburg dis-
sented on whether the “fraud-specific” discovery rule applied in the
current case.102
In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas acknowledged the existence of
a fraud-specific discovery rule, which is separate from the aforemen-
92. 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019).
93. Id. at 358.
94. Id. at 358–59.





100. Id. (citing Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F. 3d 935, 940–41 (9th Cir.
2009)).
101. Id. at 360.
102. Id. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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tioned discovery rule for equitable tolling.103 However, without hinting at
how the doctrine might affect the present case, Justice Thomas stated that
Rotkiske failed to preserve this issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit and therefore did not permit the petitioner to rely
on this doctrine.104 In her brief concurrence, Justice Sotomayor noted
that the fraud-specific equitable principle is still very much alive and that
parties are free to invoke this “well-settled doctrine” in the future.105 In
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that not only was the fraud-specific
discovery rule argument preserved on appeal, but also that the Third Cir-
cuit should adjudicate the appeal on the merits because the equitable
doctrine permits Rotkiske to bring his claim.106
The applicability of equitable exceptions to the FDCPA’s statute of
limitations remains an unresolved issue even after the Court’s ruling in
Rotkiske. While the Court made clear that the discovery rule would effec-
tively nullify the statute’s plain language, the ruling allows for further
claims under other equitable doctrines. Clearer and more precise plead-
ings will allow future claimants to avoid the Court’s ruling in Rotkiske.
VI. CONFIRMATION
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT REJECTED THE USE OF MOLINA PROVISIONS IN
CHAPTER 13 PLANS
In Brown v. Viegelahn (In re Brown),107 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the so-called Molina provisions in a Chapter 13
plan violate the debtor’s right to modify under 11 U.S.C. § 1329.108 Born
of Molina v. Langehennig, Molina provisions can be included in a Chap-
ter 13 plan to ensure that debtors may not modify their plans to pay less
than 100% of all unsecured claims, lest they lose their use of the dis-
charge entirely.109 The Fifth Circuit in In re Brown found that these
prohibitions that limit modifications of Chapter 13 plans violate
§ 1329.110
Freddie Lee Brown, the debtor in the case, filed for relief under Chap-
ter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and crafted a five-year plan that paid out a
monthly amount of $1,080.00 for the plan’s life.111 His plan included a
promise to pay secured creditors in full and “approximately 100%” of the
claims of unsecured creditors, which amounted to $7,728.18.112 Through-
out the case, the Chapter 13 Trustee objected to Brown’s plan, primarily
103. Id. at 361.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 362 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 364–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. 960 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2020).
108. Id. at 721.
109. Molina v. Langehennig, No. SA-14-CA-926, 2015 WL 8494012, at *1–2 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 10, 2015) (mem. op.).
110. Brown, 960 F.3d at 721.
111. Id. at 714.
112. Id.
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taking issue with the fact that the debtor’s monthly income was $2,191.00,
and he, therefore, had a disposable income of $1,111.00 per month.113
The bankruptcy court sought to address these objections with the inclu-
sion of one of two conditions in the bankruptcy plan: (1) the debtor could
divert all disposable income to the plan for the first seven months, after
which he would continue to divert the disposable income at a reduced
rate; or, in the alternative, (2) the debtor could incorporate a so-called
Molina provision, which would prohibit any subsequent plan modification
if it did not expressly guarantee 100% payment of unsecured claims.114
Stuck between a rock and a hard place, the debtor begrudgingly chose
the second option and simultaneously sought certification for direct ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit, which the bankruptcy court denied. Brown also
appealed the confirmation order itself, which the district court subse-
quently certified to the Fifth Circuit.115 The primary considerations
before the Fifth Circuit were whether: (1) a Chapter 13 plan is required to
adhere to both subsections of § 1325(b)(1), and (2) the use of a Molina
provision violates either § 1325(a) or § 1329.
Section 1325(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code states that, when the
holder of an unsecured claim objects to plan confirmation, the court may
not approve the plan unless: (1) the full value of the claim is to be paid
under the claim, or (2) the plan provides that all the debtor’s disposable
income will go towards payments.116 A trustee’s objection to plan confir-
mation rests on the fact that the debtor’s plan does not satisfy both of the
above subsections.117 The Fifth Circuit stated that this interpretation runs
contrary to the text’s plain disjunctive language, which makes it clear that
the satisfaction of either subsection is sufficient.118
While the court ultimately ruled against the use of a Molina provision
under § 1329, its analysis under § 1325(a) is intriguing. Section 1325(a)
lists the specific criteria that a plan under Chapter 13 must meet. There is
a split in the case law about whether judicially-imposed conditions are
permitted in addition to the express criteria of § 1325(a).119 Some courts,
utilizing the inherent powers of equity under § 105(a), permit conditions
to be imposed.120 While the Fifth Circuit did not make any express rul-
ings regarding a court’s ability to impose conditions under § 1325(a), it
did find that the Molina provision contravened § 105(a) “by its failure to
further some other provision of the Code.”121
113. Id. at 714–15.
114. Id. at 715.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 716 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A)–(B)).
117. Id. at 718.
118. Id. at 719.
119. See, e.g., Martinez v. Viegelahn, 581 B.R. 486, 494 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (permitting
judicially imposed conditions); In re Walker, 165 B.R. 994, 1000 (E.D. Va. 1994); but see,
e.g., Petro v. Mishler, 276 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 2002) (disallowing bankruptcy courts from
adding imposing conditions).
120. Martinez, 581 B.R. at 494; In re Walker, 165 B.R. at 1000.
121. Brown, 960 F.3d at 720.
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Instead of ruling that the Molina provision violated § 1325(a) of the
Code, the court found itself on much more solid footing for such a finding
under § 1329.122 This section of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to
amend a plan following confirmation, provided that such an amendment
complies with confirmation standards.123 Ultimately, the court found the
district court’s reasoning in Martinez v. Viegelahn124 instructive, where
the court held that the imposition of a Molina provision violates
§ 1329.125 The court noted that, even without such language, the debtor
will still be required to comply with § 1325(a) in effectuating any plan
modification.126
The Fifth Circuit has effectively disallowed the use of Molina provi-
sions in a Chapter 13 case. While a trustee certainly is obligated to protect
the interests of unsecured creditors, the bankruptcy court can ensure the
continued protection of such interests through its discretion over subse-
quent modification attempts. The debtor must still make such requests in
good faith and compliance with the various provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, and the unsecured creditors’ interests will be adequately protected
as such.
VII. SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION ACT
A. DEBTORS BARRED FROM RECEIVING PAYCHECK PROTECTION
PROGRAM LOANS WHILE IN BANKRUPTCY
Under the recently enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Se-
curity Act (CARES Act),127 Congress made available $659 million in
loans to qualified small businesses through the Paycheck Protection Pro-
gram (PPP). While the CARES Act is certainly wide-reaching, the Small
Business Administration (SBA) has placed limitations on who may re-
ceive such funds. One of the SBA regulations states that “[i]f [an] appli-
cant . . . is the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, . . . th[at] applicant is
ineligible to receive a PPP loan.”128
In Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation v. Carranza (In re
Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation),129 a Chapter 11 debtor
sought to obtain a loan despite being in bankruptcy. The debtor sought a
judgment from the bankruptcy court granting an injunction against the
SBA and prohibiting it from considering the debtor’s status in bankruptcy
when making a determination about issuing a loan.130 The bankruptcy
122. Id.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
124. 581 B.R. 486.
125. Id. at 496–97.
126. Brown, 960 F.3d at 721.
127. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
128. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Re-
quirements—Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg.
23,450, 23,451 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120–21).
129. 962 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2020).
130. Id. at 840.
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court granted this injunction, but the district court subsequently stayed it
and certified the issue for direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.131
As it had done before the bankruptcy court, the SBA argued that 15
U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) prohibits any court from issuing an injunction against
the SBA.132 In response to this argument, the bankruptcy court held that
the prohibition against bankrupt applicants was impermissible discrimina-
tion under § 525(a).133 Illustrating the very idea of brevity, Judge Smith
of the Fifth Circuit dealt with the case in less than one page. Judge Smith
held that circuit precedent dictated that the court absolutely cannot issue
an injunction against the SBA.134 While the debtor sought to overturn
this prohibition, Judge Smith responded by stating that a panel of the
Fifth Circuit is bound by circuit precedent under the doctrine of
orderliness.135
For now, small businesses that otherwise might qualify for a loan under
the CARES Act will not receive such aid if they are in bankruptcy. As
the pandemic continues to spread throughout the country, perhaps the
Fifth Circuit may find occasion to create an exception to this absolute
prohibition against an SBA-targeted injunction.
VIII. AVOIDANCE
A. RETURNING FRAUDULENT TRANSFER RELIEVED RECIPIENT OF
LIABILITY
In Whitlock v. Lowe (In re DeBerry),136 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit addressed whether a transferee under a fraudulent trans-
fer action may be held liable even if the transferee returns the property in
full prior to the bankruptcy filing.137 Specifically, can a trustee seemingly
“double-recover” from a transferee despite the fact the transferee already
returned the assets to the estate? In answering in the negative, the Fifth
Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court’s holding.138 The appellate
court held a trustee may not use 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) to recover property
from a transferee even if they transferred it back to the debtor before
bankruptcy.139
The dispute in In re DeBerry involved $275,000.00, coming directly
from the debtor and his wife’s joint account, that the debtor’s wife placed
into a joint bank account with her sister-in-law just a few months before
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. In re Hidalgo Cnty. Emergency Serv. Found., No. 19-20497, 2020 WL 2029252, slip
op. at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2020).
134. In re Hidalgo Cnty. Emergency Serv. Found., 962 F.3d at 841.
135. Id.
136. 945 F.3d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 2019).
137. Id. at 951.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 947.
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filing.140 Soon after opening the account, the debtor’s wife took herself
off the account and left ownership to her sister-in-law.141 Following this,
the sister-in-law made a series of payments from the account: (1)
$33,500.00 to the debtor’s daughter, (2) $9,200.00 to an unrelated and un-
known person, (3) $32,000.00 to the debtor’s wife’s personal account, and
(4) $200,000.00 to an LLC owned by the debtor.142
The above-captioned adversary proceeding arose as the Trustee sought
recovery of the $275,000.00.143 After settling with the debtor’s daughter,
the Trustee argued that the sister-in-law was liable for the remaining
$241,500.00.144 As the sister-in-law transferred the remaining money back
to the debtor and his wife, respectively, she argued that the Trustee can-
not recover the amounts owed again.145 While the Trustee argued that a
plain reading of § 550(d) meant that the single-satisfaction rule was inap-
plicable to a prepetition return, the Fifth Circuit shot down this argu-
ment.146 Writing for the court, Judge Oldham agreed with the sister-in-
law, stating that “[o]btaining a duplicate of something is not getting it
back; it’s getting a windfall.”147 Judge Oldham further explained that
courts in similar situations rely on the single-satisfaction rule in § 550(d)
to bar duplicative recovery.148
The sister-in-law was not free and clear just yet; Judge Oldham re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings, leaving the determination
of whether the transfers to the wife’s account and the debtor’s LLC were
genuinely returned to the estate.149 Regardless of the source of analysis,
courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have arrived at the same conclusion: a
trustee cannot recover property that has been returned to the debtor
prior to the bankruptcy filing.
IX. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
On February 19, 2020, the Small Business Reorganization Act
(SBRA)150 went into effect, just before the coronavirus pandemic swept
across the nation. Created to streamline the reorganization process and
reduce costs for small business debtors, the SBRA sought to incentivize
commercial debtors who otherwise might avoid a Chapter 11 restructur-
ing. Under the SBRA, business debtors with non-contingent, liquidated
debts totaling not more than $2,725,625.00 may file for relief under the
newly enacted Subchapter V to Chapter 11.151 Pre-coronavirus estimates
140. Id. at 945.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 945–46.
143. Id. at 946.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 947.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 947–48 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)).
149. Id. at 950–51.
150. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1195.
151. Id. § 101(51D)(A).
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found that around 40% of Chapter 11 debtors in cases filed after October
1, 2007, would qualify as small-business debtors under the SBRA.152
In anticipation of financial fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, Con-
gress enacted the CARES Act,153 which raised the SBRA’s statutory cap
of debts for small-business debtors from $2.725 million to $7.5 million.154
Congress designed the CARES Act to provide relief to a broader swath
of businesses that will suffer increased debts due to the pandemic.155 Fur-
thermore, the CARES Act does not have retroactive application for cases
filed before its March 27, 2020, enactment date.
X. CONCLUSION
In a year largely defined by a worldwide pandemic, the United States
has seen a record number of corporate bankruptcies.156 The sheer num-
ber of cases has allowed for a furtherance in the jurisprudence of insol-
vency. From Puerto Rico to 1 First Street, bankruptcy cases continue to
be filed in response to unprecedented uncertainty regarding business and
the economy. As of the date of writing, the pandemic continues to roar,
and the authors expect it to have a continued, incalculable impact on the
cases covered in next year’s Survey.
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